



# CANADA ET L'OTAN : RISQUES ET INCERTITUDES



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# PLAN DE PRÉSENTATION

- 1. Révision du Traité de Washington (OTAN)
  - Articles II, IV, V et les problèmes stratégiques
  - défense collective/dissuasion, sécurité coopérative, et la gestion de crises
- 2. Arctique → fin de la Whisky War!
- 3. NORAD
  - bouclier anti-missile et le Canada
  - modernisation
- 4. Risques de guerre – RCBN
- 5. Changement climatique & sécurité: le rôle de l'OTAN



# 1. TRAITÉ DE WASHINGTON - 1949



- RIT argues properly designed treaties: 1) manage strategic problems, 2) have opportunities for discretion concerning precision over which sort of collective bargaining takes priority (burden-sharing, capabilities), and 3) ensure flexibility with mechanisms to react to systemic changes, emerging challenges and insecurities.
- Article 2: The Parties will contribute toward the further development of **peaceful** and friendly international relations by strengthening their **free institutions**, by bringing about a better understanding of the **principles upon which these institutions are founded**, and by promoting conditions of **stability and well-being**.
  - l'élimination des conflits et l'encouragement à la collaboration plus que militaire entre les États.
- Article 3: In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, **separately and jointly**, by means of **continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid**, will **maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack**.
  - Capacités individuelles et jointes et soutien mutuel; écarte de capacité et conformité avec le cible 2%

# DE « KNOCKING NATO » PAR KIMBALL (2019)

- The North Atlantic Treaty is precise (it contains a total of 14 articles), but it retains flexibility with provisions such as **Article 4** (consultations in case of threat to territorial integrity, political independence or security), **Article 10** (new members), Article 12 regarding review and **Article 13** on duration and withdrawal.
- It offers opportunities for discretion in interpretation of **Article 3** (national and collective military capabilities) and **Article 5** (collective defence). Finally, it ties partners' hands with ratification, its formal signal of commitment incurred with public reputational costs.
- **Article 4** permits consultation when states are under threat, before it escalates to a call upon Article 5's military response. **Article 4** opens up other policy options apart from collective defence.

## 2. LA SOUVERAINETÉ ET LA SÉCURITÉ - L'ARCTIQUE

- ❖ Statu quo
  - ❖ CTS 1988/29
- ❖ Acteurs
- ❖ Défis




Image: NOAA

## US-Canada Agt on Arctic Cooperation 1988

Point 2...to cooperate in order to advance their shared interests in Arctic development and security. They affirm that navigation and resource development in the Arctic must not adversely affect the unique environment of the region and the well-being of its inhabitants.

Point 4... Nothing in this agreement of cooperative endeavour between Arctic neighbours and friends nor any practice thereunder affects the respective positions of the Governments of the United States and of Canada on the Law of the Sea in this or other maritime areas or their respective positions regarding third parties.

Plus UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 – unsigned by the US but considered “customary law”





# ACTEURS DANS LA RÉGION

Canada  
ÉTATS-UNIS  
Finlande  
Russie  
Suède  
Norvège  
Islande  
Danemark  
Les communautés sociales non-étatiques  
  
Dimension nordique  
Intl Barents Secretariat  
Conseil des ministres des pays nordiques  
Conseil des États de la mer Baltique  
Conseil de l'Arctique  
(Documents légaux: Convention des NU sur le droit de la mer; Accords de Paris)



## 2019 SUMMER MINIMUM



Adapted from NSIDC Charctic, <https://nsidc.org/arcticseacenews/charctic-interactive-sea-ice-graph/>




Sources: Natural Earth, Esri, University of Durham, UN, Marum

# DÉFIS DANS LA RÉGION


- ❖ Revendications territ. (highest % region) – Île d'Hans, réglé en 2022 (CAN-DEN)
- ❖ Collaboration doit se faire avec plusieurs acteurs ayant des intérêts différents
- ❖ Souveraineté – « agreeing to disagree »
- ❖ Garantir le trafic maritime commercial et assurer sa sécurité
- ❖ Protection de l'environnement (terre, mer & fonds) & changements climatiques
- ❖ Développement économique (EEZ)
- ❖ Défense continentale & sécurité
  - ❖ NORAD (2004 Amdt)
  - ❖ Défense antimissile (BMD)
- ❖ Visite de l'Arc. canadien par SECGEN, 2022
- ❖ Élargissement avec FIN & SWE, 2022
  - ❖ OTAN aura 32 alliés en 2023



### 3. BOUCLIER AMB ET NORAD



Kimball 2018 sur NORAD et son adaptation à la défense stratégique en nord Amérique



## 4. GUERRE (NUKE, CHIMIQUE)

- Risque faible à modéré, mais avec de fortes répercussions potentielles
- Prolifération nucléaire possible suivant une escalade du conflit accidentelle
  - Russie-Ukraine
    - Surveillances maritime et aérienne sont essentielle; là où NORAD & NATO partage une frontière - Nord
    - Chine et Taïwan – volonté US de défendre Taïwan si Chine escalade
    - Corée du Nord – adoption récente d'une doctrine de première frappe
  - Usage de CBR
    - Le contexte d'un conflit entre États ou entre un État un acteur interne
    - Évènement(s) d'un groupe dissident – terrorisme, radicalisme
  - OTAN JCBRN COE – recherche terrain à l'été-automne 2023

## Comparaison 2016-2020 Global Firepower Index

Rates of change > 40%

India

South Korea

Egypt

Brazil

Iran

State	2020 rank	GFP Index 2020
USA	1	0.0606
Russia	2	0.0681
China	3	0.0691
India	4	0.0953
Japan	5	0.1501
S. Korea	6	0.1509
France	7	0.1702
UK	8	0.1717
Egypt	9	0.1872
Brazil	10	0.1988
Turkey	11	0.2098
Italy	12	0.2111
Germany	13	0.2186
Iran	14	0.2191
Pakistan	15	0.2364
Indonesia	16	0.2544
Saudi Arabia	17	0.3034
Israel	18	0.3111
Australia	19	0.3225
Poland	21	0.3397
Vietnam	22	0.3559
Thailand	23	0.3571
Canada	25	0.3712
North Korea	25	0.3718
Taiwan	26	0.4008

Rank change > 2

Rank change < 2

# 5. CHANGEMENTS CLIMATIQUES ET SÉCURITÉ

- ENJEUX
  - Sécurité environnementale – menaces humanitaires – désastres liés au réchauffement & hausse du niveau de la mer qui déstabilisent infrastructures et côtes/estuaires du Canada
  - Menaces économiques – sécurité commerciale
  - (In)sécurité humaine – menaces liées aux changements climatiques sont intersectionnelles avec des facteurs sociologique - géographie, genre, richesse, marginalisation sociopolitique – ex: groupes autochtones
  - Défense et sécurité de l'Arctique
  - Menace pour les minorités de genre – plus important du à l'intersectionnalité
  - Conflits idéologiques – partis politiques, lobbys, provinces, terrorisme environnemental, « pétro-masculinité », etc.
- OTAN CCASCOE hébergé par le Canada à Montréal en 2024 & bourse MINDS CDSN

# CDSN-CLIMATE CHANGE AND NATO: COMPARATIVE STUDY (KIMBALL & MOENS)

- What (**collective defense & cooperative security**) strategic problems are affected by climate insecurities? What risks for regions, cities, theaters of operation, NATO commands, etc.?
- What is NATO's role in preventing, deterring, responding and **managing to crises** resulting from climate uncertainty over the medium to longer term?
- What agenda for a CCASCOE?
- *What can be learned by comparatively examining the COE founding documents and partnership arrangements of other COEs?*
- How can the *Climate Change And Security COE*'s design and function respond to those issues effectively (given the constraints of temporal divergences by today's leaders concerning the (negative economic and political) costs of implementing policy change and the implied intergenerational issues)?



# FIN - MERCI POUR VOTRE ATTENTION ET VOS QUESTIONS



- Monographie sous évaluation: ***Beyond 2% - NATO partners, institutions, & burden management: Concepts, risks, & models***, 200pgs, Palgrave-Macmillan, Canada & International Affairs series, soumis à l'éditeur pour apparition en 2022-2023.
- Invitation à réviser et à soumettre de nouveau à une revue scientifique: "Canada's 'open door' on 9/11: Crisis leadership, mitigating risks & adapting NORAD," pour 2023.
- Pour 2023. « Repenser l'OTAN, le Canada et l'Arctique après l'entrée du duo nordique dans l'OTAN : Capacités, collaboration et fardeaux », Eds. F. Côté et A. Simeonyi, *La guerre d'Ukraine : perspectives pour la politique étrangère et de défense canadienne*, Presses ULaval, chapitre d'ouvrage.
- **2022-2025. NATO Centres of Excellence – comparative studies**, financed CAN National Def, MINDS, co-authored book in development for 2024.

- 2018. "Future uncertainty, strategic defense and North American defense cooperation: Rational institutionalist arguments pragmatically suggest NORAD's adaptation over replacement" pp. 122-137 in Eds. C. Leuprecht; J. Sokolsky & T. Hughes, *North American strategic defense in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Security and sovereignty in an uncertain world*, Springer-Verlag International (Collection: Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications), ISBN: 9783319909783.
- 2019. "Knocking **NATO**: Strategic and institutional challenges risk the future of Europe's seven-decade long cold peace," University of Calgary, *School of Public Policy Publications, Briefing papers*, 12(36, Oct): 1-25.  
<https://doi.org/10.11575/sppp.v12i0.68129>.
- 2020. "Managing risks, side payments and multi-institutional enlargement: The role of U.S. defence and Big Four investment agreements and candidate risks on **NATO**, EU enlargement," *European Politics and Society*, 22(5): 696-715.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2020.1820152>.
- 2021 « **L'OTAN** peut-elle encore avoir un rôle multilatéral? » pp. 343-356 dans *L'après COVID-19 : Quel multilatéralisme face aux enjeux globaux? Regards croisés : Union européenne – Amérique du nord – Chine*, sous la direction d'O. Delas, O. Bichsel & B. Jouzier, Éditions Bruylant-Larcier, (Collection : Mondialisation et droit international), ISBN: 9782802769781

# STRATEGIC PROBLEMS

- **enforcement** – incentives to cheat; agreements aimed at solving these problems have rewards-punishments
- **commitment** - domestic commitment problems due to electoral constraints, time-inconsistency, (i.e. the need to tie one's hands in the LR due to an inability to commit, intergenerational time-inconsistency),
- **allocation/distribution** (concerning club resources, 'defending' territory, burdens, political power) – different preferences that actors have over alternative possible agreements; when a series of possible arrangements producing possible bargains exists-
- **uncertainty about future actor behavior** (measures/actions taken by others, detecting defection),
- **uncertainty concerning a partner's preferences** (e.g. states misrepresent preferences, verbally or through actions),
- **uncertainty about the future state of the world** (knowledge about the consequences of actions, the actions of others AND/OR the actions of institutions; that is the consequences of cooperation – the security, economic, political consequences of previous agreement concerning scientific & technical knowledge, political & economic knowledge),
- Other structures: export/codification of norms (e.g. human rights & environment); **encouraging positive/discouraging negative externalities**; gridlock; pure coordination games without uncertainty.
- The ranges of such agreements are shaped by the preference points of the most invested/interested actors and their willingness to contribute directly versus underwriting other partners in the club.

# US-CANADA AGT ON ARCTIC COOPERATION


## 1988

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# QU'EST-CE QUE UN SYSTÈME ABM?



- Simulation de Raytheon
- <https://youtu.be/JGfnnygwW4>